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At the turn of the century, the Northeast Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna (BFT-E) stock appeared to be severely overexploited with some commentators believing it was heading towards collapse [14], [29]. BFT-E, possibly the most valuable fish in the ocean, was harvested by a large number of countries. Management was ineffective, and Bjørndal and Brasao [4] described the fishery as bordering on pure open access. Unless effective management measures were introduced, the demise of the stock could be imminent [19].

In 2006, a 15-year recovery plan for BFT-E was introduced with the purpose of restoring the stock to a level corresponding to maximum sustainable yield (MSY) with a probability of at least 50 % [19]. As part of this plan, annual total allowable catch quotas (TACs) were reduced and fishing effort was curtailed. Moreover, harvesting was brought in line with quotas, while Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing has largely been eliminated. Stock size is now increasing, which has permitted higher TACs in recent years [20]. In fact, according to Nøttestad, Boge and Ferter [34], the stock is now sustainably harvested. This represents a total turnaround from the situation of less than two decades ago.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the remarkable transformation of this fishery from non-cooperative (open access) management to that of cooperative, or sustainable, management, and, in particular, whether the current cooperative Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO) is likely to remain stable in the future. The fishery is managed through the auspices of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), an RFMO in accordance with the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA; [43]). ICCAT is the largest RFMO in the world and has a substantial number of members: 52 contracting parties (CPCs) and five “co-operators”.¹ BFT-E is classified as a highly migratory stock harvested by a large number of countries, coastal states as well as Distant Water Fishing States (DWFSs).

In general, the more parties involved, the more difficult it is to arrive at a cooperative solution [6]. Moreover, several authors have questioned the very effectiveness of RFMOs (e.g. [38], [9]). Although BFE-E is a small fishery in terms of quantity harvested, it is very valuable, and it is of great interest to learn how cooperation has been achieved for BFT-E and to see what lessons it holds for management by RFMOs, in particular when it comes to highly migratory stocks. Moreover, some of the lessons may be of interest when it comes to measures to improve sustainability of fisheries in general.

Non-cooperation in the BFT-E fishery prevailed until 2007, with the collapse of the fishery a real possibility. However, it is uncertain whether the current cooperative RFMO management plan will remain stable and prevail in the long run. To address this issue, we will draw on game theory. This distinguishes between two types of games, non-cooperative (competitive) and cooperative. BFT-E is an excellent illustration of both as we will illustrate in this article.

This article is organised as follows. Section 2 will give an overview over the fishery up to about 2007 and briefly outline the legal framework for the management of species such as tuna. In Section 3, the recovery plan introduced in 2007 will be presented, and the consequences it has had on the fishery up to the present will be described. In Section 4, we will analyse the cooperative management of the stock and, in particular, consider whether the current cooperation is stable. The final section summaries the analysis and gives suggestions for further research.