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The Northeast Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna fishery: Back from the brink
Abstract
At the turn of the century, the Northeast Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna stock (BFT-E) appeared to be heading towards collapse. In 2006, a recovery plan was introduced with the purpose of restoring the stock. Stock size is now increasing. In fact, the stock is now believed to be sustainably harvested. The fishery is managed by ICCAT, a Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO). Several authors question the effectiveness of RFMOs. This paper analyses how cooperation has been achieved as well as the stability of the current cooperative management regime. A main conclusion of the analysis is that RFMO management of BFT-E is very successful. This brings hope for the management of high seas fisheries worldwide.
Introduction
At the turn of the century, the Northeast Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna (BFT-E) stock appeared to be severely overexploited with some commentators believing it was heading towards collapse [14], [29]. BFT-E, possibly the most valuable fish in the ocean, was harvested by a large number of countries. Management was ineffective, and Bjørndal and Brasao [4] described the fishery as bordering on pure open access. Unless effective management measures were introduced, the demise of the stock could be imminent [19].
In 2006, a 15-year recovery plan for BFT-E was introduced with the purpose of restoring the stock to a level corresponding to maximum sustainable yield (MSY) with a probability of at least 50 % [19]. As part of this plan, annual total allowable catch quotas (TACs) were reduced and fishing effort was curtailed. Moreover, harvesting was brought in line with quotas, while Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing has largely been eliminated. Stock size is now increasing, which has permitted higher TACs in recent years [20]. In fact, according to Nøttestad, Boge and Ferter [34], the stock is now sustainably harvested. This represents a total turnaround from the situation of less than two decades ago.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the remarkable transformation of this fishery from non-cooperative (open access) management to that of cooperative, or sustainable, management, and, in particular, whether the current cooperative Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO) is likely to remain stable in the future. The fishery is managed through the auspices of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), an RFMO in accordance with the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA; [43]). ICCAT is the largest RFMO in the world and has a substantial number of members: 52 contracting parties (CPCs) and five “co-operators”.1 BFT-E is classified as a highly migratory stock harvested by a large number of countries, coastal states as well as Distant Water Fishing States (DWFSs).
In general, the more parties involved, the more difficult it is to arrive at a cooperative solution [6]. Moreover, several authors have questioned the very effectiveness of RFMOs (e.g. [38], [9]). Although BFE-E is a small fishery in terms of quantity harvested, it is very valuable, and it is of great interest to learn how cooperation has been achieved for BFT-E and to see what lessons it holds for management by RFMOs, in particular when it comes to highly migratory stocks. Moreover, some of the lessons may be of interest when it comes to measures to improve sustainability of fisheries in general.
Non-cooperation in the BFT-E fishery prevailed until 2007, with the collapse of the fishery a real possibility. However, it is uncertain whether the current cooperative RFMO management plan will remain stable and prevail in the long run. To address this issue, we will draw on game theory. This distinguishes between two types of games, non-cooperative (competitive) and cooperative. BFT-E is an excellent illustration of both as we will illustrate in this article.
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 will give an overview over the fishery up to about 2007 and briefly outline the legal framework for the management of species such as tuna. In Section 3, the recovery plan introduced in 2007 will be presented, and the consequences it has had on the fishery up to the present will be described. In Section 4, we will analyse the cooperative management of the stock and, in particular, consider whether the current cooperation is stable. The final section summaries the analysis and gives suggestions for further research.
Section snippets
Background
The Northern Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) is a large oceanic pelagic fish and is also the largest of the tuna species [14]. It contributes fully to spawning at age five, grows very rapidly and can grow to a length of over three metres, weighs up to 725 kg and lives up to 40 years (Cort et al., 2013; ICCAT, 2019). In 1982, ICCAT established a dividing line between the east and west Atlantic, separating the stocks in order to facilitate stock assessment (Fig. 1).
The bluefin tuna recovery plan
The ICCAT Commission meeting in Dubrovnik in 2006 appears to have been a watershed when it comes to the management of BFT-E. ICCAT’s science committee, the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS), gave a clear warning about the state of the BFT-E stock, indicating there might be a possible collapse of the stock “in the near future” unless adequate management measures were implemented ([19], p.130). It was stated that “[U]rgent and strict conservation a management measures are
Analysis
The management of BFT-E has undergone a radical transformation from non-cooperative to cooperative management. To analyse this transformation, including the stability of the current cooperative RFMO management, we will make use of the theory of strategic interactions, also known as game theory. Game theory is divided into two broad categories, non-cooperative, or competitive games and cooperative games. Both types are relevant to bluefin tuna.
The theory of non-cooperative or competitive games
Discussion
The cooperative management of BFT-E has been able to withstand several challenges such as changes in the geographical distribution of the stock which has allowed a number of newcountries to join the fishery. Despite these challenges, RFMO management of BFT-E has remained remarkably stable. As far as we can see, there are three main challenges to the future stability of the cooperative agreement. First, (unexpected) changes in the environment. Second, IUU fishing. Third, the new member problem,
Author's statement
This document has been prepared by me in accordance with relevant ethical standards.
Acknowledgements
This research is based on funding from the European Commission Grant Agreement number: 773713 – Pandora - H2020-SFS-2016–2017/H2020-SFS-2017–2. I would like to thank Leif Nøttestad, who has provided me with much valuable advice and information. I also thank Ray Hilborn, Gordon R. Munro and several anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments.
Källa: Science Direct